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Abstract
Public concern about anthropogenic climate change has grown over the last decade,
and world governments have ramped up efforts to meet the challenge. The United
Kingdom recently pledged to reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050. While ambitious
mitigation goals indicate the right intentions, the target’s success depends on the
efficacy of the government’s climate policies. National and international climate strate-
gies are dominated by research into low-carbon energy sources, and programmes to
charge large emitters. These strategies have solid foundations in economic theory but
are hamstrung by slow rates of diffusion of new technologies and industry opposition
to carbon taxes. Drawing on the increasing public support for drastic climate action,
policymakers should implement interventions that focus on reducing consumers’ de-
mand for energy and other carbon-intensive products. These consumer-facing policies
would enable meaningful individual action, complement existing climate interventions
and widen the government’s avenues to net zero.
Introduction
A recent study, co-signed by 11,000 scientists,
warns that our planet is facing a climate emer-
gency [1]. To avoid disaster, they recommend
an immediate and significant reduction in global
emissions. Last year the United Kingdom leg-
islated a target of net zero emissions by 2050.
However, current policies neglect the abatement
potential of demand-side changes. Like most
countries across the world, the UK’s core cli-
mate policy focus is threefold. First, research
funding stimulates innovation in breakthrough
low- or no-carbon technologies. Second, deploy-
ment of low-carbon technologies, such as off-shore
wind energy and electric vehicles, is encouraged
with subsidies and tax breaks. Finally, a car-
bon pricing scheme aims to charge emitters for
the environmental harm they create. All three
branches of current climate policy address how
upstream producers of goods, services or electric-
ity – the ‘supply-side’ - can reduce their emissions.
Alternative policies aim to change consumption
patterns – the ‘demand-side’. Figure 1 compares
supply-side and demand-side policies. In order to
create enough mitigation to meet climate scien-
tists’ call to action [2], UK climate policy should
utilise demand-side policies to reduce the emis-
sions burden.
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Figure 1: Definitions of supply-side and demand-side policy interventions. Note that some authors
take a different definition of supply-side policies (eg, Hoel [3] defines supply-side as pertaining only to
the supply of fossil fuels, rather than the use of fossil-fuels by manufacturers and producers).
So far, so supply-side
To date, the UK’s carbon policy primarily ad-
dresses how the supply-side can reduce its cli-
mate impact. In particular, low-carbon innova-
tion dominates headlines and soundbites. How-
ever, the potential for new technologies to stop
climate change is hampered by the time delay
between invention and widespread use. Most in-
novations - particularly energy technologies - take
decades to go from prototype to market-ready [4].
Instead, ambitious deployment of existing low-
carbon technologies could reduce our reliance on
polluting fossil fuels relatively quickly [5]. Green
energy sources such as wind and solar are a key
component of this strategy. While they are usu-
ally more expensive than their dirty equivalents,
prices have fallen faster than expected in the last
decade [6]. Nonetheless, widespread uptake of
renewable energy requires extensive changes to
the electricity grid to accommodate intermittent
generation [7], which we can expect to be slow
and pricey. Smil [8] has shown that previous
large-scale transformations of the energy market
have taken three to five decades. In order to
meet climate targets, a grid-scale energy transi-
tion would need to happen faster than ever before
[9]. Energy needs might be reduced by improving
current technology and processes in industry and
manufacturing. It has been proposed that better
allocation of energy and materials in manufac-
turing could save both money and emissions [10].
However, a large body of literature casts doubt
on the existence of these win-win industrial effi-
ciencies. Allcott [11] suggests that business-side
barriers, such insufficient information about po-
tential energy savings, prevent these seemingly
free gains.
Charging emitters for their environmental im-
pacts boosts incentives to decarbonise [12]. A
carbon price can be imposed using direct taxes
on emissions, or permit trading schemes where a
regulator sets a cap on total emissions by allocat-
ing allowances to emit. Firms can trade permits:
the resulting permit price is the carbon charge
[13]. The world’s largest carbon pricing scheme is
the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) [14]. The UK has taken a reasonably
proactive stance on carbon pricing by implement-
ing a price floor that boosts the level of the EU
ETS [15]. However, the current price floor of £30
per tonne of CO2-equivalent gases is still far off
the true environmental cost of emissions, which
most experts agree is between £60 to £80 per
tonne of CO2 [16]. Some estimates put damages
even higher - at more than £300 per tonne of CO2
[17] (see Figure 2). Implementing higher carbon
prices is difficult. Voters are justifiably concerned
that carbon prices disproportionately affect low-
income people [18]. Moreover, industrial stake-
holders lobby against taxes that cut into their
profits [19]. Already, subsidies in carbon-heavy
industries like steel have been shown to reduce
the effective carbon tax rate by up to 95% [20].
The result is a carbon price that has negligible
impact on industrial profit margins and gener-
ates insufficient motivation to achieve meaningful
emissions cuts.
2 Cambridge Journal of Science & Policy, Vol 1 (2020), Issue 1
Expanding the policy menu: demand-side interventions
Figure 2: The price of carbon in Europe and the
UK compared to estimates of the cost of carbon
emissions. * EU ETS price as of 6 January 2020.
Sources: [21]; [15]; [16]; [17].
The UK government should leverage the economic
power of demand. Demand-side policies would
complement carbon taxes and change commer-
cial incentives of heavy emitters. The last 30
years of climate policy have shown that the tra-
ditional supply-side mechanisms are not enough
to achieve required emissions cuts. Moreover,
the worldwide dominance of these policies has
eclipsed other policy options [22]. A coalition
of civil societies go further, arguing that the fo-
cus on carbon pricing narrows the vision of do-
mestic and international policy negotiations [23].
Subsidies for low-carbon innovation and carbon
taxes remain necessary. However, they should
be implemented alongside policies that enable
individuals to influence carbon-producing activi-
ties. To achieve its net zero ambitions, the UK
needs to utilise both supply-side and demand-side
interventions.
Turning to demand
Climate policies have mostly addressed emissions
reductions that don’t affect final consumers [2].
Allowing for policies that require meaningful pub-
lic engagement would hugely expand the policy
menu. Demand-side policies encourage changes
in how people use energy or purchase goods (see
Figure 1). They can encourage environmentally-
informed decisions such as lowering the thermo-
stat or buying smaller cars. Policies designed
to influence individual choices can be contro-
versial, but governments can achieve meaning-
ful change by capitalising on societal pressure
for climate action. Opportunities already exist.
Flight-shaming, or flygskam, the social movement
that discourages flying, has already prompted
Swiss bank UBS to halve their estimate of next
year’s global aviation growth based on passen-
ger surveys [24]. Social movements like flygskam
offer governments a chance to entrench change
by incentivising carbon-friendly choices, such as
stay-cations or train travel. Demand-side climate
policies can have far-reaching impacts on society.
The impacts are positive when emissions-saving
choices have non-environmental benefits, or ‘co-
benefits’. Financial co-benefits of environmental
policies exist when efficiency gains yield cost sav-
ings. Demand-side policies can also yield improve-
ments in health and lifestyle. For example, urban
planning laws that allow for higher-density hous-
ing in central boroughs slow urban sprawl, result-
ing in fewer driving hours and healthier transport
options [25]. A wide-scale shift to low-meat diets
would have health co-benefits [26]. However, cli-
mate policies can also have undesirable impacts.
Careful thought must be given to the impact of
demand-side policies on disadvantaged groups,
especially if policies make carbon-intensive neces-
sities more expensive. Lessons can be taken from
previous unsuccessful interventions. The French
government’s plans to increase carbon taxes on
diesel fuel sparked the ‘gilet jaunes’ movement
in 2018. The tax hike would have disproportion-
ately affected poorer rural residents, who tend to
drive further distances and drive diesel cars [27].
After three weeks of violent protests, the French
government abandoned the tax increase.
The gilet jaunes movement highlighted the risk
of imposing climate solutions with uneven social
impacts. This lesson is particularly pertinent
for price-based policies: low-income households
cannot absorb price increases, so would have no
choice but to cut back consumption. Whitmarsh
[28] suggests that demand-side policies should
retain individuals’ sense of agency and help them
translate their values to behaviour changes where
possible. Using non-price levers for low income
households might be a way to nudge them towards
climate-friendly decisions without adding exces-
sive financial burden. By their nature, demand-
side interventions will affect people’s lives in more
ways than just their climate footprint, whether
that is improving their health or increasing their
cost of living. These social side effects - both
positive and negative - should be emphasised and
quantified in climate policymaking in order to
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maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of
demand-side policies.
Alongside changes in individual decision-making,
another avenue for change is through climate-
friendly businesses. Social change is usually seen
as top-down or bottom-up. However, research sug-
gests putting more emphasis on the middle-out
role of professionals and practitioners [29]. The
middle-out perspective rests on individual action
from within organisations to create and facilitate
social change. For example, industry group In-
vestment Property Forum considers how to drive
investment in energy efficiency improvements in
rental homes [30]. They recommend that prop-
erty managers encourage the use of ‘green leases’,
which share cost savings between tenants and own-
ers. Some firms facilitate change by encouraging
employees to participate in climate demonstra-
tions. Several companies, including Patagonia,
Lush and Burton, shut stores to allow workers
to join the Global Climate Strike in September
2019 [31]. Other proposals include initiatives to
enable engineers to design buildings with less
carbon-intensive materials [29], or encouraging
climate-friendly car fleet managers to adopt elec-
tric vehicles [32]. Middle-out change from firms
and practitioners complements demand-side ini-
tiatives, and could help cement a rethink in the
approach to climate mitigation.
Demand-side climate policy would reduce future
mitigation requirements from as-yet-undeveloped
technology, and could be deployed relatively
quickly. The diffusion rate of demand-side miti-
gation policies is under-researched. Qualitative
studies suggest that societal transitions can be
non-linear – social tipping points can drive sud-
den transformations in beliefs and behaviours
[33]. For climate change, these non-linearities
mean that demand-side mitigation may propa-
gate much faster than supply-side interventions
[34]. The UK government can look to other coun-
tries for demand-side success stories. Norway’s
electric vehicle policy, most of which was rolled
out in the last 20 years, makes it cheaper to own
an electric vehicle using tax breaks and lower
registration fees. The policy has proven success-
ful; 40% of cars sold in 2017 were fully electric
[35]. Transport accounts for a third of the UK’s
total emissions [36]; encouraging electric vehicle
purchases is a key avenue to tackle this sector.
The UK government could achieve meaningful
and timely demand-side mitigation by applying
lessons from international case studies.
The time to act is now
The 2050 net zero target requires broadening
the policy remit, and there is no better time
than now. Current policies generally focus on the
companies that emit, but emissions reductions
would be swifter if policy also covered the individ-
ual decision-makers who drive demand. Climate
protesters are walking out in the millions [37];
environmental vegetarianism is on the rise [38];
more people are avoiding carbon-intensive fly-
ing [24]. Policymakers need to capitalise on the
increasing social frustration at stalled climate ac-
tion to push through policies that would have
been unthinkable a decade ago. In particular, the
strategies they pursue should enable individuals
to use their own influence, as consumers, voters
and workers, to lessen their country’s impact on
the environment.
The UK’s current mitigation strategies of inno-
vation support and carbon pricing have achieved
some emissions reductions, but the government
needs society’s help to meet the mitigation needs
of the 21st century. Figure 3 shows UK emissions
have fallen 37% since 2000 [36], driven mostly
by supply-side savings. However, the impact of
current policies is curtailed by long innovation
timelags and industrial barriers to tax. Tradi-
tional mechanisms cannot be relied on to achieve
the emissions savings necessary to avoid serious
climate damages. Policymakers must consider
unconventional alternatives. Policy can play a
role in prioritising the changes in behaviour that
can have the most impact. The Committee on
Climate Change’s report that prompted the 2050
net zero target briefly discussed how citizens
could effectively contribute to mitigation by mak-
ing climate-conscious choices, such as moving to
mostly plant-based diets [39]. Discussions on the
most effective methods to create demand-side
change must be more highly prioritised in climate
policymaking.
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Figure 3: UK emissions since 1990. Source: [36]
Up until now, the UK has pursued climate poli-
cies that do not affect the majority of their voters.
Policymakers underestimate people’s desire for
meaningful climate action. Societies have been
spurred into change before, albeit at a smaller
scale. Nuclear testing in the South Pacific was
banned after galvanising protests [40]. Ozone
depletion ceased after outcry from scientists [41].
Climate movements – from school walkouts to Ex-
tinction Rebellion – indicate a growing policy gap
between society’s desired climate action and what
has been implemented so far. Policymakers must
fill that gap with new policies that enable indi-
viduals and businesses to make climate-conscious
choices. Interventions that reduce energy demand
will complement existing price mechanisms and
cut emissions. Policymakers must look to the peo-
ple if the UK is to achieve net zero carbon in 2050.
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